```
180102naacpC
                              Conference
 1
              (In open court)
 2
              THE DEPUTY CLERK: NAACP v. East Ramapo Central School
 3
     District.
              MS. CALABRESE: I'm Ms. Corey Calabrese for the
 4
 5
     plaintiffs.
 6
              THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Calabrese.
 7
              And you're Mr. Grossman?
 8
              MR. GROSSMAN: I am, your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT: And Ms. Parvis and Mr. Jason, good
10
    morning. Good afternoon, I mean.
11
              And there you are, Mr. Butler, back in your old seat.
12
     And who is with you?
1.3
              MR. BUTLER: Mr. Levine.
14
              THE COURT: From your law firm, and then everybody
     else is from the state? Ms. Matthews.
15
16
              MS. MATTHEWS: Yes.
17
              THE COURT: Ms. Connell.
18
              MS. CONNELL: Yes.
19
              THE COURT: And Mr. Taylor.
20
              MR. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor.
21
              THE COURT: I'm just going to draw myself a little
22
    map.
23
              Ms. Calabrese, you're from Latham; Mr. Grossman,
24
     you're from the NYCLU; and Ms. Parvis, where are you from?
25
              MS. PARVIS: Latham.
```

1.3

2.2.

Conference

1 THE COURT: You're Latham.

And Mr. Jason, you're from NYCLU also?

MR. JASON: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have lots of letters. I've got -- well, in addition to the plaintiffs' motion for injunction, I have Mr. Butler's letter of December 11 regarding the motion to dismiss that the school district would like to make. I have Mr. Butler's December 15 letter suggesting that briefing on the PI motion be stayed. I have plaintiffs' December 15th letter responding to the letter regarding the stay. I have plaintiffs' -- I have the state's the December 20th letter regarding the motion the Commissioner would like to make. And then I have plaintiffs' December 26th letters responding to the district's pre-motion letter regarding its motion to dismiss, and the Commissioner's pre-motion letter regarding her motion to dismiss.

And I think I let the parties know, shortly after getting the letters on the stay, that I was not likely to stay the briefing on the P.I. hearing unless I was convinced by the pre-motion letters either that the motions to dismiss were clearly meritorious, or the motion for P.I. was clearly not. And I will tell you that I have not reached either of those conclusions.

What I'd like to do, if it won't slow things down too much, what I ordinarily do, which is, give the plaintiff the

1.3

2.2.

Conference

opportunity to amend, because I don't want to have to possibly grant a motion and then possibly have to give leave to amendment and then have another motion.

Part of the reason I have these pre-motion letters is because I think once the plaintiff gets the idea from the pre-motion letters what the motion is going to look like, if there's something that the plaintiffs think they can add to the complaint that would help them defeat the motion to dismiss, I give them that opportunity. I don't know if this is that kind of case because the issues that the proposed motions raise are more legal than factual. Ordinarily, I do give the plaintiff that opportunity.

We have the complication here that there's a P.I. being sought. And I gather what plaintiffs would like me to do before May is not necessarily figure out the right way to have that election but to enjoin the election from going forward under the current system.

Is that accurate?

MS. CALABRESE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you had a chance to discuss with the other parties whether they agree it makes sense to combine any hearing on the P.I. with a trial of the merits?

MS. CALABRESE: We proposed it to the defendants, but we haven't reached an agreement on that. To be clear, I don't know their opinion.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

THE COURT: Do you have an opinion, Mr. Butler or Ms. Matthews?

MR. BUTLER: Yes. We don't think it's necessary in this circumstance to combine the preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, particularly, since, as the Court recognized, this is a two-stage process, in any event. So for purposes of going forward, we would not be in favor of combining them.

THE COURT: I don't think I can do it over their objection, but if part of the concern is cost, which I hope at least the school district has in mind, it might be something to consider.

Let me ask some questions about the proposed motions to dismiss. It seems to me, Mr. Butler, most of what you point to in your letter are statutes that don't really say anything one way or the other on whether there can be wards or whether it has to be at-large. I didn't see in Sections 2018 or 2032 anything saying thou shall not have wards. And the only thing that you cited to which said a Board of Education has only those powers expressly delegated by statute or necessarily unreasonably implied therefrom is a Commissioner decision, which I can't imagine would hold up if I found that there was a violation of the Voting Rights Act.

MR. BUTLER: Were you to find a violation of the Voting Rights Act, you're correct, you could order whatever is

1.3

2.2.

Conference

necessary under the circumstances. But in the absence of some authorization from the legislature, the district can't simply do something by itself, and that is not limited to voting issues. It has to do everything the district does. Its powers are delegated, and in the absence of a delegation, they don't have the power.

THE COURT: Doesn't it have the power to run elections for the school board?

MR. BUTLER: Yes. They are --

THE COURT: So what is stopping them from saying, either because I pushed them to or because they think it's right, that we should have --

MR. BUTLER: They run the elections as — they administer the elections. They don't decide how the election is supposed to be done globally. They don't decide upon a ward district. They don't decide on an at-large voting. They simply take what they are given and are instructed to administer an election, which is what they do.

THE COURT: But the basis of your motion is we're not the right defendant because we couldn't do this, even if you told us to.

MR. BUTLER: Correct. And we pointed out --

THE COURT: I don't understand how that can be right.

If I tell them -- I have no idea if I would ever get there, but let's say I did, and I said it's a violation of the Voting

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2.

23

24

25

180102naacpC Conference Rights Act for you to proceed with this election under the current system, and you need to do it by ward. And I'm going to draw you a map and here are your wards. What's stopping them from complying with that order? MR. BUTLER: Actually, if they're parties in this case and they're instructed by you to do that, probably nothing, other than someone else reviewing it. THE COURT: So, then why aren't you a proper defendant? MR. BUTLER: Because, in the first instance, that instruction would come down from the Commissioner, it would come down from the legislature, it would come down from the governor. THE COURT: If it came down from me and you could

implement it, what do I care about all that other stuff?

MR. BUTLER: Perhaps nothing if we're properly a party in the case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUTLER: Now, if you conclude --

It's circular to say I can't be a party in THE COURT: the case because I wouldn't be able to implement your ruling if in fact you would be able to implement my ruling.

MR. BUTLER: Our position isn't that we couldn't implement something you tell us to do. Our position is, we don't have the authority to set up that form of election

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2.

23

24

25

180102naacpC Conference process on our own. And in the absence of that authority, we're not the proper party to be sued in this case. THE COURT: So who is? MR. BUTLER: The governor, the legislature through the Secretary of State, the -- perhaps others who -- how ever one normally sues in these kinds of voting cases, you go way above the grade of the school district. THE COURT: I don't know. If this were an election for the town board, I would have to sue the governor to get the town board to comply with the Voting Rights Act? MR. BUTLER: The town board is a different situation than the school district. THE COURT: Well, why? Why is that?

MR. BUTLER: Because we are not delegated authority to set up these kinds of elections by ourselves.

THE COURT: But where does it say you can't do this?

MR. BUTLER: Where does it say we can't do it? It goes the other way: Where does it say we can?

THE COURT: That's what I'm getting at. The only thing that you've cited to me that says we can only do things we're specifically delegated is a Commissioner's decision, and it didn't involve a situation where what you were doing violated the Voting Rights Act.

So if I got there, it just seems circular to me to say we're not the right defendant because we couldn't implement the

1.3

2.2.

Conference

order that you might reach in this case; and the reason we can't implement the order is because we have to be told by the governor or the legislature to do something and at the same time say, oh, we could implement your order, but we can't be a defendant because only your order would allow us to do it.

I'm not following.

MR. BUTLER: Well, if you'd like us to brief it, we're happy to brief it.

THE COURT: Of course you're going to brief it, but it just seems like you're saying we're not the right defendant because we can't give the relief that the plaintiffs want, but you're conceding that you can if I tell you to.

MR. BUTLER: If we're subject to your jurisdiction, yes.

THE COURT: So I don't understand why there's no standing or it's not justiciable or whatever, but maybe you will be able to explain it better, but I don't see it.

The other thing I didn't really follow was the argument that election districts within the meaning of Education Law 1702 aren't the same thing as ward voting.

You cite the *Port Chester* case and in the *Port Chester* case, as a matter of fact, the election districts that have been set up there weren't wards, but in that case, there's nothing in that case that says when you're talking about a school board. That case involved a village board, a totally

Conference

different animal - Education Law not even applicable.

But in that case, it so happened that the way the village set it up is that they had election districts, which basically told you which polling place to go to, but it was essentially an at-large election.

But I didn't see anything in 1702 or the *Port Chester* case that would prevent setting up wards, which the plaintiffs want, if they can prove that there's a violation of the Act without them.

MR. BUTLER: It comes back to the same issue, your Honor. Perhaps there's nothing that says you may not do it, but our point is, there's nothing that tells us that we may.

THE COURT: Well, doesn't the Voting Rights Act tell you you may if the Court tells you to?

MR. BUTLER: Yes, but in the absence of a Court telling us, this isn't something that a district does.

THE COURT: Okay, but that doesn't mean you're an improper defendant, does it?

MR. BUTLER: Well, if there are defendants who should be in the case who aren't in the case and against whom the lawsuit should be directed, then, yeah, we shouldn't be here.

THE COURT: Well, can't the plaintiffs decide who they want to sue? And as long as you'd be in a position to implement anything you were ordered to implement, why can't they sue the district directly?

1.3

Conference

Why do they have to include the governor or the state legislature if they can get what they want this way?

MR. BUTLER: That's the point. That's not the way they're supposed to get it.

THE COURT: Yeah, well, you're going to have to come up with something more than that, like some authority for the proposition that they can't get it that way, because I really -- I gotta tell you, I'm scratching my head over that argument.

MR. BUTLER: Okay.

THE COURT: And ironically, the Commissioner has taken the position that she's not the right person, either, because she says she can't ram a ward voting system down the district's throat. It's sort of funky that everybody's saying, Well, I can't do it.

I don't know who wants to speak for the state, but

Ms. Matthews, why -- what is the -- to me, it seems like the

state should be or is pretty much a bystander here. I assume

if I say there's a violation of the voting Rights Act, the

state isn't going to have any quarrel with implementing a

remedy.

Why shouldn't the Commissioner stay in the case, just in her official capacity so that a remedy can be implemented?

MS. MATTHEWS: In answer to your first question, that's right, if the Commissioner is authorized to comply with

2.2.

Conference

your Honor's ruling, she will do -- she will do so, but that's not a basis for keeping her as a defendant in a lawsuit where she's not a proper party.

THE COURT: Well, how could I order her to do anything if she's not a party? What if she needs to be involved because the district convinces me that, unless she blesses it, they can't correct the problem here, but if she's not a party, I can't just go out and start ordering her to do things.

MS. MATTHEWS: Part of that is hypothetical, but to the extent there is an order against the district, the Commissioner will obviously comply with such an order, whether she's a party in the lawsuit or not. If her authority or --

THE COURT: Let me ask plaintiffs' side,

Ms. Calabrese. Are you really worried that the Commissioner of

Education is going to stand in the way of implementing a

absolution?

What do you need the Commissioner in here for?

MS. CALABRESE: Your Honor, it's not so much that we're concerned that the Commissioner would stand in the way of any type of relief sought. It's more that we believe that she actually does have the authority to order the district to comply with the ward system. So we believe either defendant here could give us the relief that we seek. And she has broad authority to enforce all general and special laws, that includes federal laws and it includes the Voting Rights Act.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

And in the past, she has, in fact, through her Commissioner opinions, ruled on issues that would be considered Voting Rights Act violations. And so, to say that she does not have that authority here or that she would be a bystander, we believe that she could order the district to comply with the Voting Rights Act right now if she believed the merits of the plaintiffs' case.

THE COURT: Well, in the meantime, the state's going to have to spend a lot of money tagging along essentially on this litigation. And if, at the end, I decide there's a violation, they're representing that they'll implement it.

They don't really care -- I mean, maybe I'm making the wrong assumption, but if all they're going to be doing is sitting there while you and Mr. Butler duke this out, that doesn't seem like a great use of resources.

MS. CALABRESE: And we agree. And we approached each defendant separately to settle the case because we believe each defendant would have the authority on their own to work out the ward system and get rid of this case.

I think it would be important if the Commissioner were involved and if your Honor were to find that the Commissioner has the authority to implement a ward system; this is an issue in lots of other school districts across New York State where minorities are not being fairly represented on the board and it could have some very valuable precedential effect.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

THE COURT: I feel like East Ramapo is somewhat unique, but I haven't dug into it. Obviously, the parties are going to brief all of these issues, but I'm not going to stay the P.I. motion, so we have to figure out in what order we're going to do things.

Yes, Mr. Butler.

MR. BUTLER: If that's the case, then my suggestion would be that we brief both issues in a single filing, that we will oppose the preliminary injunction and devote a section of our brief to this motion to dismiss issue, because we're going to have to do that work any how. It makes no sense.

THE COURT: That makes sense, and if you persuade me, then they're not likely to succeed on the merits.

MR. BUTLER: That's point one. Point two, in terms of timing, working backwards from a concern with the May date as the sort of time we've got to worry about, if you will, May 15 is the date that the election involved is supposed to occur, we would ask to have until March 9 to file our opposition papers and to conduct the necessary discovery.

We also need to work with experts and put together an appropriate response to those papers, and anything short of that will actually be too short a time for us to really do the proper kind of presentation on this issue. And then, plaintiffs, I would suggest, they have not agreed to this, but I would suggest that they then have two weeks to reply. And

1.3

Conference

then we'll have the entire month of April, if you will, to set a time for a preliminary injunction hearing -- actually, the entire month of April and part of May.

MS. CALABRESE: Your Honor, as we stated in our letter to the Court, we propose that the defendants respond to our preliminary injunction motion by February 9, which would give them a full two months since the date we filed to respond to all of our papers and is an extensive amount of time compared to other cases where there have been preliminary injunctions, including cases with expert reports.

We would need more than two weeks to file our reply if there's going to be responses to expert reports. That would be our only issue.

THE COURT: I have so many letters. I don't have -- what's the date of the letter where you made that proposal?

MS. CALABRESE: December 15. It's docket number 43. Port Chester is a good example. There was a preliminary injunction in that case, and the parties had five weeks to respond to three expert reports and nine declarations and produce three expert reports of their own in response.

THE COURT: What's your best guess as to how many days a hearing it would require?

MS. CALABRESE: We think about two weeks. Ten days total. That was when we were thinking about consolidation.

THE COURT: I'm pretty sure I can't consolidate over

180102naacpC Conference their objection; am I right about that? It's Rule 65. 1 2 MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, your Honor. 65(a)(2). 3 THE COURT: It doesn't say I need their consent. 4 Before or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a 5 preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the 6 merits and consolidate it with the hearing. 7 The complication comes if there's a right to a jury 8 trial, I don't know if there is, but maybe that's something the 9 parties can also brief in their one omnibus submission they're 10 going to make. 11 MS. CALABRESE: Your Honor, with respect to an omnibus 12 motion, obviously what's best for the Court, but we just wanted 1.3 to note, if there is a possibility that you decide one defendant is the defendant in the motion to dismiss and that we 14 could reach a settlement and save everyone's time and money, 15 16 then that would be our only concern, is waiting for briefing on 17 the P.I. as to motions to dismiss. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Butler, are your clients at all 19 inclined to resolve the case? 20 MR. BUTLER: Well, the proposal we've received is 21 "give up" and "no." 2.2. THE COURT: Well --23 MR. BUTLER: We don't believe --

THE COURT: If, upon seeing the complaint and seeing the affidavits, you became convinced that the plaintiffs were

24

25

Conference

right, then maybe your clients would.

MR. BUTLER: Yes, but the problem here, your Honor, is that just the opposite happened. Based upon the presentation, we believe you're not going to issue a preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Well, don't hold your breath about a settlement, Ms. Calabrese.

MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, we would just note that we do not intend to oppose the P.I. on the merits, though we reserve our right to oppose it, that the state here is not a proper party. And the state is potentially subjecting itself here to costs and fees of a tremendous amount.

THE COURT: I mean, it seems like the injunction that the plaintiffs are seeking would run to the school district, not to the state. So, I don't think you would be losing out on anything substantive if you stood aside for the P.I. hearing, but you might as well brief the motion to dismiss on the same schedule. If I agree with you, then you're out for good.

Did you want to add something, Mr. Grossman?

MR. GROSSMAN: I did. If the Commissioner is a proper party, then she's able to, in fact, enforce the Voting Rights Act as a law general and especially applicable to the education system of the state, then the Commissioner should be able to settle the litigation and impose upon the district a ward system, regardless of the district's position on whether our actions were meritorious or whether they're a proper party.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

THE COURT: The school district seems to think that the governor or the legislature have to get involved and it's not just the Commissioner. I don't know if they're right, but --

MR. GROSSMAN: The Commissioner has made very clear, and so has the Second Circuit, that the education system, including school board elections, is entirely the province of the Commissioner of Education. The governor is outside the chain of command in that respect and is kept at a distance. I believe it's established in the Yonkers case from 1995 in the Second Circuit.

So the Commissioner really is the chief law enforcement authority when it comes to the education system, which, as we note in our letter, encompasses the school board election system.

THE COURT: Ms. Matthews, I don't know if your client has even dug into the merits. Do you agree that if she became persuaded by the plaintiffs' presentation, that she could put us all out of our misery?

MS. MATTHEWS: No, your Honor. And the plaintiffs haven't cited a single authority for the proposition they just stated. The Commissioner does not have the authority to impose a ward system on the state. I mean — and both the governor and legislature make it clear that there needs to be an act of the legislature to impose this system on the state.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

THE COURT: Well, they may think that, but part of it is, I guess, a chicken-and-egg problem. The commissioner, if there were an order from me saying there's a violation of the Voting Rights Act, implement these changes, says she can do it, but she can't just decide herself that she thinks there's a violation, and she could change —

MS. MATTHEWS: To be clear, there has been no finding by anyone in this case.

THE COURT: No, but it's possible that you would read the plaintiffs' papers - I don't expect this because I'm not that lucky - but you could read the plaintiffs' papers and say, wow, there is a violation here and it should be fixed and the Commissioner is going to fix it.

MS. MATTHEWS: But the commissioner doesn't have the independent authority to make a Voting Rights Act to find a Voting Rights Act violation.

THE COURT: No, but the Commissioner could say not under her -- she doesn't have the authority to enforce a Voting Rights Act, but maybe she has the authority to impose it because she's the Commissioner of Education and she thinks the election should be fair.

MS. MATTHEWS: But there are provisions in the Education Law that provide for at-large voting throughout the state and without -- I can go into --

THE COURT: What are those? Because when I looked at

2.2.

Conference

what was cited in Mr. Butler's letter, I didn't really see where it says there has to be at-large voting.

MS. MATTHEWS: It's not that the statute says anywhere "There is at-large voting throughout the state," but there are several provisions within the Education Law, 2012, 2102, 1702. And when you read them in conjunction, together they require the voters in every district vote at-large in every election.

THE COURT: Yes, I looked at those, and I just didn't see where it said that, but you'll spell it out for me, I'm sure, in your papers.

And believe me, I understand why you don't want to be involved in this slugfest, but you're sort of in the weird position of saying on the one hand, this is not our fight, we don't want to be involved, and on the other hand saying we can only implement a remedy if we are involved.

MS. MATTHEWS: But the legislature and the governor have made clear that these provisions provide for at-large voting in the state, and the plaintiffs essentially --

THE COURT: It may say that, but let's say I don't.

MS. MATTHEWS: If there's a Court order, it's a different story, but as we are right now, the provisions provide for at-large voting in the state. And the plaintiffs here are asking the Commissioner to independently override the democratic process here. They're asking her to just impose a system in the district here that conflicts with what the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2.

23

24

25

Conference

provisions, taken together, not -- if you read one, you may not understand the full panoply here, but they're asking the Commissioner here to just go in and impose her will on the district when the statutory provisions don't allow for that. MS. CALABRESE: As we noted in our letter, first of all, we think what we're doing is trying to ensure that the democratic process is being followed appropriately. But as we noted in our letter, there is a commissioner decision, Gravink, where the Commissioner has found that Section 2017 of the Education Law permits a ward system. And the commissioner has --THE COURT: Can she ram that down the throat of a district that doesn't want it? MS. CALABRESE: We believe she can through her authority as the Commissioner of Education to enforce the Education Laws. THE COURT: Which decision was that? MS. CALABRESE: Gravink, your Honor. THE COURT: Is this in your December 26 letter? MS. CALABRESE: Yes, your Honor. MR. GROSSMAN: Your Honor, it's cited in the letter responding to the district, not the letter responding to the Commissioner. It's incorporated by reference, the letter responding to the Commissioner, docket number 47. THE COURT: Page three?

1.3

2.2.

Conference

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, that was the case where the school district wanted to create wards because the rural people weren't getting their candidates on the board.

MS. MATTHEWS: That case -- first of all, the quote that plaintiffs are using was in dicta, and it did not establish a ward system; it established separate election districts for geographical purposes. The legislature was clear in passing a bill recently that would have addressed the issue of ward voting. They were clear that they needed to pass a bill specifically giving districts the opportunity to vote and impose a ward system in their specific districts because there was no statutory provision that provided for ward voting.

THE COURT: Wasn't that legislation, which the governor ended up vetoing, not really relating to this issue at all? Wasn't it relating to the -- sorry. I'm missing it now.

I remember looking at it and saying, oh, this doesn't relate to this issue at all, but now I don't remember what it did relate to.

MS. MATTHEWS: The bill would establish wards for school board members to vote to impose a ward system.

MR. BUTLER: It would give a district the right to present by referendum in a proposal to the voters to substitute a ward system for at-large voting. That's what the bill was designed to accomplish, and the governor vetoed it.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

But I think counsel is right. In the preamble, the legislature absolutely recognized that the school districts do not have that authority under current law.

THE COURT: I don't doubt that the legislature reads the law that way, but it seems to me -- well, I would imagine I have to give some deference to how the legislature interprets its own legislation, maybe. But whether you call it a ward or an election district, there is a statute out there that says you can have an election district, and I don't know what's out there saying that an election district can't be a ward, or a precinct, or whatever you want to call it, unless a federal judge says otherwise.

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, the reason why the statutes have been interpreted this way is that because — in 2018 and 2032 of the Education Law, the way they set up the way these elections work is that each district has a number of qualified voters, and they have a certain number of school board seats. And all of the qualified voters of the district get to vote for each seat, and each seat is considered a separate office. But there's nothing that says that qualified voters can be restrained or restricted from voting for other seats just because they are seats that will represent some other geographic subdivision of a district. That's the piece that's missing and why ward voting isn't allowed.

There's nothing that allows a school board to say,

2.2.

Conference

okay, you qualified voters who live in this neighborhood, you don't get to vote for these other offices, these other school board seats, and that's what ward voting would require. It would require the school board to say, okay, you in this neighborhood, you get to vote for this one office; you in this neighborhood, you get to vote for another office; and you in this neighborhood get to vote for another office. And that's where there's a gap between what the plaintiffs want and what the school district is actually empowered to do. And that's one of the reasons why the school board couldn't settle this case even if it wanted to, because it couldn't enact that kind of policy.

And the problem for the Court in entering an injunction along those lines would be that, yeah, the Court has the preemptive power under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution but there are pretty serious federal concerns and also separation of powers concerns if a Court is going to say, all right, I'm going to superintend how the elections are conducted in the school district forevermore.

What the plaintiffs really want is a change in the law, right, the state law going forward. And to do that, they actually need to bind the state and the legislature has to pass a new statute, and that's the way the remedies typically are crafted in cases like this.

THE COURT: Well, I now understand part of your

1.3

2.2

Conference

argument, which is the remedy the plaintiffs are seeking would conflict with state law, assuming that state law says every voter gets a vote for every seat. If we assign seats to wards, then you're only getting to vote for the seat in your ward, but I didn't understand them to be asking that. Maybe I should stop right there.

Is that what you want? You want a situation where we whack up the town geographically and the Ward 1 only gets to vote for Seat 1, and Ward 2 only gets to vote for Seat 1, etc.?

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes.

MS. CALABRESE: That is what we're asking. We don't believe that the sections that both defendants keep citing to require a vote per person for every seat on the board. It's just not in there.

THE COURT: I'm going to have to, obviously, spend some quality time with these statutes and see what they really say.

But going back to your other point, Mr. Levine, is it not true that every time a federal court finds a violation of the Voting Rights Act, it's using its powers under the Supremacy Clause to do something that arguably raises comity concerns, but it's important enough because people's votes are being diluted?

MR. LEVINE: Yes, absolutely. And that's why you can look at cases like the *Goosby* case, which went back and forth

1.3

2.2.

Conference

to the Second Circuit, as a good example of what happens in a redistricting Voting Rights Act case, which is what this case is most like, because the plaintiffs are asking for districts to be established, it's a lot like redistricting.

And when a federal court concludes that districts are necessary or redistricting is necessary, usually we'll find that in the first instance and then say, okay, I'm going to kick this issue back to the appropriate legislative body to determine what those districts should look like because it's not appropriate for a court to do that outside of a legislate I've process, unless it's absolutely necessary to do so. And that's what happened in the *Goosby* case. And that's what we submit should happen in this case if it gets that far, but the appropriate legislative body wouldn't be the school board.

MS. CONNELL: If I may, in Voting Rights Act cases involving school boards, a number of the cases cited to your Honor involve cases where only the local school board and its members are parties.

The court comes in if it finds a Voting Rights Act violation, finds dilution, crafts a remedy. It does not — that's different than a constitutional challenge to a state statute. That's true even where a state statute establishes at-large voting.

I think when you said that this SED is sort of a bystander here, you were exactly right. The SED's and the

1.3

Conference

Commissioner's general oversight ability doesn't mean the commissioner is a proper party to every lawsuit that touches upon education, and she's not a proper party here. How ever you want to read and play with the statutes, when they're taken together - and granted, they're a little opaque - but when you take them together and you see how SED reads them and how the legislature reads them, the commissioner did not have and does not have authority to impose a voting ward system that would require her to set aside state laws in the absence of a finding of a Voting Rights Act violation, and that she can't do.

That being said, she's not going to get involved in whether there is voting dilution here. She's not going to oppose the plaintiffs' experts or come in with experts on her own, but she wants the opportunity to show that she isn't an proper party here. And in fact, I do think the district is a proper party. And the fact is that it would subject the state to significant costs and fees, and we wouldn't bring anything to the table.

There's been no showing that we're a necessary here. Plaintiffs' own complaint is utterly devoid of any allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the commissioner. And unlike some other Voting Rights Act cases, there are actually allegations of steps she has taken to address problems, including election problems but no finding of Voting Rights Act violations in the district.

1.3

2.2.

Conference

You know, I appreciate that we'll go along with this briefing schedule, but naming her because there's some idea she has the ability to impose ward voting is just not legally founded, and the cases plaintiffs cite don't support it at all.

So, I would ask if there's any way in the briefing schedule to allow the opportunity for the state to sit back and not take part in the hearing in trying to preserve resources, that that be considered because --

THE COURT: That's fine with me. You don't have to take a position on the hearing or get involved. I understood that you weren't going to. I just thought, for management purposes, you would brief your motion to dismiss on the same schedule that we're going to set.

Mr. Grossman.

MR. GROSSMAN: Respectfully, I think that the commissioner's opinion construes her authority too narrowly. She is given a broad grant of authority over the State Education System. She is given a specific grant of authority over the State Election Law System. She has authority to ensure that elections are fair.

We do note in our complaint steps she has taken to remedy the quality of education in East Ramapo, but we also know that there are two monitor's reports, monitors appointed by the commissioner, who identify serious flaws in the democratic process, flaws that amount to Voting Rights Act

1.3

2.2.

Conference

violations. And she has abdicated her responsibility under Section 305 and Section 2037 to ensure that elections are fair.

And so, we would say that there's a level of responsibility that she bears, and to carve out the Voting Rights Act as a law that is not a general or special law applicable to the education system of the state I think is an absurd reading of the statute.

THE COURT: My memory was that when the monitors were put in place, it was the legislature that could have empowered the monitor to impose changes, and they pulled their punches and decided they were, for reasons known only to them, not going to do that.

MS. CONNELL: And the monitors noted, your Honor, that a change -- they didn't find a Voting Rights Act violation.

That has not been found by anybody. And they noted, and that's not quoted about the plaintiffs, that they would recommend that the legislature consider certain changes to the current voting scheme to allow for ward voting because the monitor saw it was not permitted.

Furthermore, the monitors recommended certain changes and practices and have been undertaking that process. The Commissioner has been active in this district to address concerns, which voting is one part of it; financial decisions are another part; policy choices are another part. That's absolutely unfounded to say they made Voting Rights Act

1.3

2.2.

Conference

determinations and, based on that, the commissioner can act.

MR. GROSSMAN: Respectfully, that's a misrepresentation of what I said.

I said the monitors, who were appointed by the commissioner, did find serious harms to the democratic process. They've both identified that public school parents, members of the public school community, were unable to elect their candidates of choice in the process. And they both recommended changes, reforms to the process, that would allow for members of the public school community to elect members of the board.

They didn't make a specific finding of a Voting Rights Act violation; that's absolutely right. What we're alleging here is that when they use the words public school community and private school community, they are referring to white and minority, because, as we've alleged in the complaint and shown in the P.I., you have a private school community that is over 99% white children and a public school community that is over

So, yes, we would absolutely suggest that the monitors did not find a Voting Rights Act violation, and you're right, that the monitors did not have authority to overrule and implement a ward system on their own. The commissioner of education, however, who, again, I point to the broad grant of the authority, has the authority to make sure that school board elections comply with all applicable laws and regulations. The

1.3

Conference

Voting Rights Act applies to school board elections.

And so, if the commissioner is empowered to enforce other federal laws - the IDEA, the Civil Rights Act - I don't understand why it would exclude only the Voting Rights Act.

MS. CONNELL: And, yet the commissioner is not a proper party to all IDEA lawsuits, nor is she empowered to be a roving force to make Voting Rights Act determinations and impose ward systems contrary to state law. There's not one authority cited to support that, and that's because the result is irrational and undermines the democratic process, but we'll brief it all for your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's talk about some practicalities.

Is there anything you want to amend in your complaint?

MR. GROSSMAN: Not at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, if we're going to need -if I'm going to need to rule by May 15, which is really May 11
because I'm going away May 12, we need to have this hearing in
April; and if it's really going to be two weeks, we need to
have this April 9.

MR. BUTLER: Is there any way we can start it the next week?

THE COURT: No, because that's not going to give me enough time to rule before I go away. I'm sorry, but that's just the way it's got to be. If we do it April 9 and it goes two weeks, then I only have -- oh, excuse me. Hold on.

Conference

If we started April 16, which is what you're asking 1 2 for, and we finished April 27, then I would have two weeks. 3 MR. BUTLER: That's what I'm asking. 4 THE COURT: I'll split the baby with you. Let's start 5 April 11, just because I think two weeks to synthesize two 6 weeks' worth of evidence might be cutting it close. 7 MR. BUTLER: Can we start on the 12th? 8 THE COURT: Is that really going to make a big 9 difference to you? 10 MR. BUTLER: Yes, yes. I'm going to be away. THE COURT: When do you get back? 11 12 MR. BUTLER: The 11th. 1.3 THE COURT: Okay. Start the 12th. And I'm really 14 going to hold everybody's feet to the fire. 15 So briefing, we're going to work backwards from there. 16 Let me think a moment. You can all sit. I'm sorry. 17 February 16, defendants' opposition to the P.I. 18 hearing, if any, and cross-motions to dismiss. 19 March 9, plaintiffs' reply on its P.I. motion and 20 plaintiffs' opposition to motion to dismiss. 21 March 16, defendants' reply on motion to dismiss. 2.2. Then, March 23rd, affidavits of direct examination of those witnesses within your control. And then the hearing 23 24 will be April 12, and hopefully finished no later than the 25 23rd. And then that will give me a couple of weeks and

Conference

1 change to rule, but I'll do the best I can.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. BUTLER: We need more time than February 16 to file an opposition.

It might be instructive to find out how much time the plaintiffs have had to work on the case, when they hired their experts, when they started working on this injunction and chose to file it when they did, but I don't really care. The fact is, we need more time. We have to hire experts. We have to take discovery. We have to prepare the appropriate papers.

That's not going to be -- February 16 --

MR. BUTLER: I want to take the deposition of every single one of their experts. I want to take a red deposition of their declarants. There are 13 different declarants, three different experts. This is not just a simple -- I don't know, I'm sure you looked at this. This is a foot stack of documents that they filed. And there was a lot of work that went into putting it together. There's going to be a lot of work necessary to prepare an appropriate response.

And giving us until March -- until February 16 just doesn't give us time to do a proper job.

THE COURT: Well, you've had the motion since
February -- since December 8. I'm sure you went out and

25

Conference

1 immediately started working on your experts and your 2 opposition. You've got --3 MR. BUTLER: No. THE COURT: -- a lot of resources. 4 5 MR. BUTLER: No, it's not that simple to hire experts 6 during the Christmas and New Year's time of year, number one. 7 Number two, there are other issues that are involved. We had 8 to assimilate. There are issues having to do with this motion 9 to dismiss that we had to consider. 10 THE COURT: Look, I literally can't give you anymore 11 time. 12 MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, what's the rush? 1.3 THE COURT: There's an election that may be violating 14 federal law and diluting the votes of people, and it relates to the education of children. 15 16 MR. BUTLER: And if you find there to be such a 17 violation, you can enjoin the election. 18 THE COURT: Only if I do it by -- before May 15th. 19 MR. BUTLER: Okay. 20 I literally don't have any more time to THE COURT: 21 give you. And right now, we have a schedule that gives me two 2.2. weeks to decide this issue after the close of two weeks 23 of testimony. I can't push it any further than that. 24 MR. BUTLER: Frankly, I'm not sure that I understand

SABRINA A. D'EMIDIO - OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER (914)390-4053

what's going to involve two weeks of testimony here. We're

Conference

1 | talking about --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2.

23

24

25

THE COURT: But you just told me they have 13 declarants and three experts, and you're going to have experts.

MR. BUTLER: Pardon me?

THE COURT: You, I assume, are going to have experts.

MR. BUTLER: I want to hire them; yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUTLER: But I don't know -- one of their experts is an expert who is apparently talking about what wards would be created. Another expert has to do with other stuff. And then there's a statistician.

THE COURT: Well, maybe you don't need to deal with that expert now --

MR. BUTLER: The question is, do they need to put on that expert at a preliminary injunction hearing? The answer to that is no. So I'm not sure why two weeks is necessary. I think a much shorter period of time. In fact, you may be able to rule on this based upon the papers.

THE COURT: I doubt it.

MR. BUTLER: Well, we're not going to be able to prepare our papers properly if we are only given until February 16 to file our opposition papers.

THE COURT: I have a high level of faith in you.

We've had another case together, and I never saw one iota of difficulty in your law firm spewing out stacks of papers under

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2.

23

24

25

Conference

very short deadlines when it was necessary.

MR. BUTLER: And, your Honor, that's true, and we

would do that here if we had to, but we don't have to.

THE COURT: I don't see how it's avoidable if I have

to rule before May 15. I mean, this is a very tight schedule.

I'll grant you, I'm putting myself on as tight a schedule as

I'm putting on you guys.

It was filed December 8. There will have been about two months and 10 days for you to file your opposition.

MR. BUTLER: Well, two months and ten days from the date it was filed, perhaps, but not the date when we could actually start working on an opposition.

THE COURT: I don't know why you couldn't start working on an opposition on December 8.

MR. BUTLER: Because we didn't. We can't. We couldn't. But that's not important.

THE COURT: Yes. I don't get why not.

MR. BUTLER: We had to review it. We have reviewed it, and we have formulated some approaches in mind.

THE COURT: Yes. And I'm sure somebody started sniffing around for experts, or, if they didn't, I can't understand why.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, you've extended three weeks at the back end of this for a reply. Why do they need three weeks? Give them two weeks. Give us that extra week.

1.3

Conference

THE COURT: Because they're replying on their motion and they're opposing your motion to dismiss, --

MR. BUTLER: Two weeks.

THE COURT: -- both parties, motions to dismiss.

MR. BUTLER: Two weeks? What's wrong with two weeks?

THE COURT: You're getting until February 16; they're getting until March 9; they're going to reply in one week to March 16; and we're having the hearing April 12.

Whoever you're calling on direct, I need the affidavits of direct examination by -- I can stretch that one a little bit, I guess -- by March, let's make it 26.

And if turns out that once you've seen each other's each other's affidavits, anybody who has a different view of what the hearing is going to look like, and it's not going to be as long, you'll let me know and it can slip. But right now, I have a representation from plaintiffs that they think it's 10 trial days. I don't think that they're making that up. Hopefully, it will be shorter. As I said, we're going to work a long day, and I'm going to hold the lawyers' feet to the fire. Hopefully, it won't take a full two weeks, but if it turns out that when you file your affidavits of direct examination on March 26, each side is only calling two or three witnesses and it's not going to take two weeks, great, I'll push it off. But I understand it doesn't leave a heck of a lot of time to do papers, but there's six weeks between now and

1.3

2.2.

Conference

February 16. And the motion was filed almost a month ago, and that's adequate time. So that's going to be our schedule.

And in terms of discovery, the parties should confer and propose an orderly process, because I don't want to have a situation where, you know, defendants are dropping their expert affidavits on March 9 and the defendants want to take depositions between then and March 16. That's not going to be -- that's not going to be practical.

So either there aren't going to be depositions of defendants' experts or they're going to have to take place before March 9.

What I'd like you to do is confer with each other about when defendants are going to serve their expert reports. Obviously, the plaintiffs' experts need to be made available sooner than that.

If you can't agree on an orderly process for depositions of fact witnesses and disclosure of defendants' experts and depositions of both sides' experts -- well, if you can or you can't, let me know by a week from today, January 9. And send a joint letter with the parties' dueling proposals, and I'll either rule or get Magistrate Judge McCarthy involved who was just as thrilled as I was to see the East Ramapo Central School District back.

What are the odds that she and I would both get it in round II? All right.

25

Conference

So let me say these dates. By January 9, you're 1 2 either going to agree on a discovery schedule or submit dueling 3 proposals. 4 February 16, defendants' opposition to the P.I. motion 5 and cross-motion to dismiss. 6 March 9, plaintiffs' reply on the P.I. motion and 7 opposition to the motions to dismiss. 8 March 16, defendants' reply on the motion to dismiss. 9 And then March 26 for the affidavits of the 10 direct testimony; and the hearing will commence April 12. 11 Is there anything else we should do this afternoon? 12 All right. I'll see you --1.3 THE DEPUTY CLERK: April 12 at 9:00 a.m. 14 THE COURT: April 12 at 9:00 a.m. 15 MR. GROSSMAN: If I can raise one thing. 16 It is our firm and fond hope that there's a way to 17 resolve this before going to the hearing. And if a defendant 18 or defendants can be properly identified earlier, we would very 19 much appreciate a chance to settle this case so as not to waste 20 the state's and the district's money and to preserve the 21 Court's time. 2.2. THE COURT: How do you think that will go? MR. GROSSMAN: I'm an eternal optimist, your Honor. 23 Ι 24 wouldn't work for the organization I do.

SABRINA A. D'EMIDIO - OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER (914)390-4053

THE COURT: I don't know if you've tangled with the

1.3

2.2.

Conference

people that Mr. Butler represents before, but from what I've heard, and you'll correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Butler, they have no interest in resolving it.

Am I right?

MR. BUTLER: We're somewhat in the same position as the Commissioner is. We don't have the authority to do what the plaintiffs are asking us to do. The district -- and let me state very clearly: the district wants to the abide by the law. Period. It believes what its doing now abides by the law.

If you conclude that they're doing something wrong or that there isn't a violation and it's appropriate to order them to do something, of course they'll do that. But to turn to us and say, Will you do what they want you to do, we can't, just like the Commissioner can't. We cannot do it.

THE COURT: Well, if the school board were willing to do it but for what it regards as an inability to do it because of state law, you might have something to talk about, because there may be - I don't know what it would be - but it sounds like Mr. Grossman has some ideas as to who would have to be involved to make that work.

But if your client's position is, We would do it but for our inability to do it, but we don't think there's anything wrong with the current system and have no intention of cooperating and changing it, then there's no point in discussing this any further.

1.3

Conference

MR. BUTLER: I'm not sure exactly what the position is. I can tell you, it's not exactly how you articulated it, even if they're taking the extreme position, in part because we don't believe that there is a Voting Rights Act violation presented by plaintiffs, and we will show you that. We will show you that in our opposition papers.

MS. CONNELL: If I may. That forecloses any settlement with the state. We've been very clear and adamant, and I think we'll show you and it will be very clear to you, that we have no authority to impose the ward system that plaintiffs seek. They don't even allege that in their complaint. There's no allegations against the Commissioner in the complaint. But even if we could, our investigation reveals that we can't shake hands with the plaintiff and say, Hey, we think this voting is not working; we're going to impose a new system.

There would have to be specific factual agreements and findings involving the district about what's going on in that there's a Voting Rights Act violation that's going on; that would then have to be blessed by the Court.

That's the only way that I could see settlement happening, and if that's not going to happen with the district, we can't do anything. Our hands are tied.

THE COURT: Agreed. I don't think anything can happen without the district being on board as a practical matter, but

1.3

2.2.

Conference

how do these cases -- many of them do get resolved. How does that happen? Is it a consent decree, and then the parties agree to something, and I sign off on it, and then you have an order you can implement?

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, your Honor. A consent decree would resolve everything.

There's an official in New York State who is responsible for ensuring that the election system in the East Ramapo Central School District complies with the Voting Rights Act. It's either the district or it's the Commissioner. One of these two defendants, and we believe both of them, could remedy this defect.

I believe -- well, your Honor, the plaintiffs believe that the Commissioner does have the authority to agree to implement a ward system to a carry out her duty to make sure the election is complied.

THE COURT: Could they agree to that without conceding there's a violation?

MR. GROSSMAN: I would have to research that and get back to you, your Honor, but if plaintiffs are looking for a remedy, we are not looking for any special admissions. We are not looking for any particular costs to be borne. We're looking for a remedy to make sure that the 2018 election complies with the Voting Rights Act, and that is all.

THE COURT: Well, I think the ball is in your court to

Conference

figure out how this would work and what the mechanism would be. 1 2 I've heard Mr. Butler say that he doesn't believe there's a 3 violation. I've also heard him not completely rule out trying 4 to resolve the case, although, I didn't hear him rule it in, 5 either. But I think if their position is there's no violation, 6 any remedy on consent would -- let me put it this way: If the 7 state defendants are of the view that they can only jump in and 8 get involved if I find a violation, and the school district 9 isn't going to agree there's a violation, then there's an 10 impasse. 11 But if you think there's a way to thread that needle, be creative, God bless, but prepare for the hearing, too. 12 1.3 MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 14 THE COURT: If you get somewhere in your conversations and it would be helpful to have a magistrate or a mediator get 15 16 involved, let me know. I would be delighted for that to 17 happen, but I think the ball's in plaintiffs' court. 18 Anything else? All right. Thank you, all. 19 20 Certified to be a true and correct 21 transcript of the stenographic record 2.2. to the best of my ability.

23

U.S. District Court Official Court Reporter

Jakrina A. Vemidio

25

24